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who will h a \c  th e benefit of his efforts, if successful, should  
beat the risk of his exceeding his authority in m ailers in cid ­
ental to the doing of the acts, the p erform ance of which has 
heen delegated to hiin .il
For these reasons, it would appear that the bank was entitled 
to debit the company’s account for the amount of the cheque. 
Southern Cotton Company should, therefore, not rccover the 
amount.
Robert W ebster 
III Law, U.N.B.
Southern Methodist University Law School Case Note:
The question raised by this set of facts involves interpretation 
of section 9(3) of the Uniform Negotiable Intruments Law, which 
has been adopted in all American jurisdictions. Being a codifica­
tion of the common law, many involved problems of construc­
tion must be left to the courts for decision.
The American courts hold that an order instrument paid on 
a forged indorsement cannot be chargcd against the account of 
the drawer,1 unless the drawec-bank can prove cither that the 
instrument was a “bearer” instrument anci payable on present­
ment,- or that the drawer is estopped to deny its validity.
W hen checks are bearer instruments and transferable by 
delivery, indorsement of the name of a designated payee, whether 
forged or not, is superfluous, and may be disregarded as immater­
ial.- The admission of the drawer of the “cxistcncc of the payee 
and his then capacity to indorse”3 docs not estop the drawer from 
charging the bank with paying on a forged indorsement of the 
named payee, unless the drawer had knowledge that the payee 
was fictitious and was in cffect estopped as a party to the fraud.'
The drawec-bank therefore must prove that the instrument 
is a bearer instrument. The applicable section of the N IL is 
scction 9(3), which says that “the instrument is payable to bear­
er, when it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing 
person, and such fact was known to the person making it so pay­
able”.
II. Craig v. Sam ir [1940] I D .L .R . 72, a t pp. 72-7.1, citin g Collins, M. R. in
H am lyn  i>. /oliti H ouston  n  C o . [1908] I k . IV 81, at pp. 85-fi.
1. U niform  N egotiable Instrum ents I.aw s. 23 ; Allan W are P ontiac v. First
X a t’l. Hank (1941) 2 So2d 7i>; Toltnan i>. A m erica n  X a t’l. Hank (1901)
22 R .I. 462. 18 A 480, .'>2 L R  A 877. 84 Am . St. R ep. 850 ; ( .r a n d  L o d ge
A .O .U .W . v. Slate liank.
2. U n iform  N egotiable Instrum ents Law s. 30 (5U L A  457 , note 15); (1941)
92 H o n . 8th . 142 p. 974. l .R \  191.') B . 815; Pittali, et al r». I.itnrood
(1951 Me».). 241 SW 2d 83.
3. U niform  N egotiable Instrum ents Law  s. Gl.
4. 146 A L R  81(1. and casts cited.
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This section states two questions. First, was the payee fictiti­
ous? Second, was this fact known to the person making it so pav- 
able? B y the weight of authority, an instrument drawn to the 
order o (  a named payee will be considered drawn to the order of 
a fictitious payee if the payee is cither a person unknown to the 
“person making it so payable” and not intended to reccivc or bene­
fit from the instrument, or a person known to the “person mak­
ing it so payable” to be a real person, but not intended to benefit 
therefrom.’
In this case, the payee named in the instrument falls within 
the first class named above, and is clearly a “fictitious payee” 
within the meaning of section 9(3) of the N IL. The question 
remaining therefore is whether the fictitious character of the 
payee was known to “the person making it so payable” .
On this point there is a great array of decisions, expounding 
various “doctrines”; reaching, for the most part, similar results. 
Generally, the doctrines fail into one of tnrec rationales— the 
“Actual Maker” test,'1 the “Nominal Maker” test,7 and a class 
of cases applying 110 “doctrine” but rather basing their decision 
on the principles of agency.8 It will reasonably appear, on close 
examination of the reasoning of the various approaches, that lia­
bility is finally determined on agency principles.
Under the “Actual Maker” rule, known as the Kentucky 
Rule, the words “person making it so payable” are held to refer 
to the person who actually drew the instrument, whether he was 
the nominal maker or not. The intent of this person, as to the 
fictitious character of the payee, determines whether the instru­
ment is “bearer” in nature. In the parent case setting forth this 
doctrine,6 the person who actually drew the instrument was the 
official signing officer of the drawer. As such, his acts were the 
acts of the drawer, and, within the apparent scopc of his authority, 
binding 011 the drawer. This doctrine has been followed in a 
minority of American jurisdictions.
Under the “Nominal Maker” doctrine, known as the Miss­
ouri Rule, “the person making it so payable” refers to the “legal 
or ultimate maker” of the instrument. The intent of the drawer 
is controlling. W hile the intent of agents of the drawer, acting 
within the apparent scopc of their authority, is binding as the
.'>. X  oil on  ¡ ’. Cit y liimk & Trust Co. (1923) 294 F . 839; St-idman v. X nrt It 
C a m den  T rust Co. (1939) 122 N JL  580 . 7 A2d 40«; C om . x>. ( .lo b e  
In d em n ity  Co. (193«) 323 !‘a. 261 , 185 A 79«. 118 AI R 115, and rases 
cited .
«. M u eller  k  M aitin  v. L iberty  Ins. liank (1920) 187 ky. 14, 218 SV\ 465.
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intent of the drawer,1' the drawer is not bound by the acts of an 
employee acting outside the apparent scope of his authority. This 
was the holding, and the only nolding, of the Supreme Court of 
Missouri, in American Sash & Door Co. r. Commerce Trust Co., 
where the “defrauding employee had nothing to do with the 
execution of the checks or the delivery of them” to the payees.7
W hile some courts have treated these two rules as contrary 
to each other, they are in fact complementary. They reduce to one 
rule, and its corrolary: when the agent has authority to draw an 
instrument on the principal, then if the agent docs draw an instru­
ment to a fictitious payee, such instrument is, as to the principal, 
bearer paper, and a Dank paying 011 indorsement of sucn payee’s 
name is protected (Kentucky Rule); when the agent does not nave 
such autnoritv, real or apparent, and obtains the principal’s sign­
ature 011 such paper through fraud, the principal being ignorant 
of the fictitious nature of the payee, the instrument is not payable 
to bearer and a bank taking such paper gets 110 title thereby 
(Missouri Rule).10
In the third class of cases noted, reference is often made to 
one or both of these “doctrines”; however, the essential decision 
of the court turns on the principles of agency. Perhaps the clear­
est example of this is the case or Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. 
v. Wells Fargo Bank* In this ease the defrauding employee
was the drawer’s general manager of a branch office, who caused 
chccks to be issued bv the drawer’s home office on the basis of 
information supplied by the employee. The employee was auth­
orized to, and did, sign the instruments as co-signer. After point­
ing out that “the authorities establish the proposition that the 
drawer or maker of the check and the ‘person making it so pay­
able’ can be . . . different, and that it is the knowledge of the 
person making it so payable that is controlling”, the California 
court, quoting the ease of Los Angeles lnv. Co. v. Home Savings 
Bank of Los A ngelesH says “it is elementary that a principal will 
not be charged with knowledge of an agent under such circum- 
stanccs (perpetration of an independent fraud on the principal); 
. . . .  This, of course, is very different from an agent binding his 
principal bv acts done within the scope of (his apparent) author­
7. A m erica n  Sash a n d  D oor Co. v. C o m m erce  T ru s i Co. (1982) 332 M o. 98, 
56 S\\'2<l 1031; lu ju ita h le  l .ife  A ssurance Society v. X a t ’l. Hank of C o m ­
m erce  (1910) 181 S\V 1170; (i lo b e  In d em n ity  Co. j'. First X a t’l. Hank 
in SI. L ouis  (1939) 133 S\V2d loOO.
8. (ioodxeai l ire a n d  Itlib ber  Co. i1. W ells I'atgo Hank  (1934) 1 C.al. A pp.
2«! 094. 37 l’2d 183; I.os A ngeles I in'. Co. x1. H o m e  Savings Hank of Los
A n geles  ( 1 9 1 9 )  180  C a l. 6 0 1 , 182 P 2 9 3 .
9. R estatem en t. Agency, ss. 159, 173. 177.
10. 71 M .R  822.
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ity.” Thus the California court, in holding the drawer liable on 
the instrument did not impute knowledge to the principal, but 
rather i:eld the drawer liable for the acts of its agent.
There are, of course, anomalous cases following no clear 
application of any of these rules. Perhaps two citations from our 
own jurisdiction will clearly point out the confusion which has 
surrounded the issue. In the case of Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. 
First National Bank of Dallas,11 2nd Republic National Bank of 
Dallas v. Maryland Casualty Co. et al ,1“ on similar facts, the 
court reached a decision that the checks in question were not bear­
er instruments. Each case involved false claims submitted to the 
home office of an insurance company by branch claims personnel, 
on the strength of which the company issued checks, wnich were 
to be delivered by the employee to the “claimants” . In the first 
ease the court ruled that since only the employee had knowledge 
of the fictitious character of the payee, the drawer was not liable 
on the instrument. In the second case, the same result was reach­
ed on the ground that the fraudulent employee did not have 
authority to approve payment, only authority to deliver the 
checks.
Both of these Texas cases would have been decided with 
opposite results under cither the Missouri Rule7 or under the 
authority of the Goodyear Tire and Rubber case. Under the bare 
statement of the Kentucky Rule, these two decisions seem correct. 
However, in both cases, the act which caused the instruments to 
be executed, and the act which put them into circulation, payable 
to fictitious payees, was one committed by the agent of the draw­
er, acting within the apparent scope of his authority. Therefore, 
the drawers in each case should nave been held liable to the 
drawee banks on the instrument.®
Professor Britton, in his work on Bills and Notes, has sug­
gested that the American courts have led themselves into confus­
ion, as to the proper understanding of the meaning of “the per­
son making it so payable”, by failure to recognize the nature of the 
two problems raised in section 9(3) of the N IL. The first problem 
is to determine whether the named payee is in fact fictitious. The 
intent of the “person making it so payable” is properly raised in 
the solution of this problem. The second is whether the drawee 
may chargc the account of the drawer for payment on the instru­
ment. The drawee may charge the account, when the person who 
caused the check to be issued against the drawer was an agent of 
the drawer, acting within the apparent scope of his authority.13
11. (1951) 245 S\V 2d 237.
12. (1946) 1X4 S\V 2d 49f».
13. B ritto n , Bills and Notes, I 19 1943).
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Analysis of the foregoing eases, in light of Professor Britton’s 
comments, will show two results. First, that the apparent conflict 
between jurisdictions as to the proper interpretation of section 
9(3) of the N IL will be reconciled. Second, that the results readi­
ed b\ the California courts’“ are based on this analysis.
Sixteen states, including Missouri, have, bv legislative action, 
changed the wording of section 9(3) of the N fL to read: “W hen 
it is pavable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person 
or to a living person not intended to have any interest in it and 
such fact was known to the person making it so payable or was 
known to his employee or otlier agent who supplies or causes to 
be inserted the name of such payee”, thereby clarifying the intent 
and construction of the statute, and eliminating the necessity of 
applying any doctrine of interpretation.14
Thus as a result either of statutory change or of application 
to the construction of this section of the N IL of the principles 
of agency, the overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions 
have resolved the correct rule to be, that whenever an agent of 
the drawer is intrumental in causing a check to be issued payable 
to a fictitious payee, and in so doing the faithless employee was 
acting within tlie apparent scope of his authority, the instrument 
is a bearer instrument, and a bank paying on it may cliargc the 
account of the drawer therefor.
Those states which have modified the N IL, as indicated 
above, have gone bcvond Britton, and beyond the California 
courts. If an employee, acting entirely outside the scope of his 
authority, real or apparent, causes a check to be issued by his em­
ployer, with intent that the payee named therein shall not reccivc 
anv benefit therefrom, the drawer will be liable on the instrument 
to the drawee paving on the instrument, under the amended 
statute. T he drawer would not be liable to the drawee bank under 
the California decisions, sincc the faithless employee was not act­
ing within the apparent scopc of his authority.
T his modification of the N IL  is the one recommended by 
the American Banking Association. The effect of it is that a 
check, payable to a fictitious person, is payable to bearer if it is 
issued in the normal coursc of the drawer’s business.
14. li iifo rm  N cgotialile Instrum ents l.aw s. il (.*{); !» l ’niform  I.aws 
Annoiateci 128; \ i i /o n a .  1 il."» I ; A labam a. 1 Ór» I ; Arkansas. I9.'>3; 
C alifornia. 194.'»; F lorid a. 19"»"»: G eorgia. 194"»; low a, I9."».H; M in ne­
sota. I9">.H; M issouri, I94">: New M exico, 191."»; N otili C arolin a. 1949; 
O regon. 1949; I tali. 19-Vl; V irginia, I9">(»; West V irginia, I9."»l; 
W xom in g. I9"»l.
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Under the facts of the instant case, application of any rule 
of interpretation or statutory modification would result in a dec­
ision that the drawer cannot recover from the drawee the amount 
charged against the account of the drawer. Since the employee 
was the signing officer of the drawer, the Kentucky and Missouri 
rules are satisfied, as is the modified statute. And, since the act 
was committed within the apparent scope of the agent’s authority, 
the agency analysis, as set forth by Professor Britton and the 
California court, is satisfied. Indeed, even the anomalous jurisdic­
tions, such as Texas, would concur on these facts, since the acts 
of a corporation’s executive officers, though a fraud on it, are 
binding 011 the corporation, as to third parties, if done within the 
scope of their apparent authority.
Robert Keegan and Gordon Jackson 
S.M .U. Law.
Comment:
Although it would appear from the wording of the Bills of 
Exchange Act that only one problem need be resolved, that the 
payee be fictitious or non-existent, while the Negotiable Instru­
ments Law has the further requirement that such fact be the 
intention of the person making the instrument so payable, this 
apparent difference disappears upon an application of the two 
statutes to a particular set of facts. In Canada, in order to ascer­
tain whether a payee is fictitious, a determination must first be 
made of the intent of the party causing such person to be named 
as payee, for there is 110 other method to determine whether the 
payee was intended to have an interest in the instrument. I11 the 
United States, the existence of such intent is an express require­
ment of Section 9(3) of the Negotiable Instruments Law. It 
would appear that in both Canada and the United States upon 
proof of intention that the payee be fictitious, then the instru­
ment is payable to bearer.
C O N ST R U C T IO N  W O R K  — N E G L IG E N C E  — LIA BIL­
IT Y  O E C O N TR A C TO R S — D U T Y  O F C O N TR A C TO R  — 
PL A IN T IFF  A W A RE O F DANGER.
'The result of the recent House of Lords decision in A. C. 
Billings &  Sons Ltd. v. R iden1 is that contractors interfering with 
the acccss to a building must use reasonable care to ensure that 
persons lawfully2 entering will not be injured because of the inter­
ference. 'The appellant contractors while reconstructing the
1. [19571 3 All K .R .I; see the com m ents by R. K. M egairy, (1957) 73 l.aw  
( ) .R c \ . 294 and 433 and T . L . M ontrose (1958) 21 M od. L . Rev. 7(>.
2. T h e  lespondent was lawfully 011 the prem ises; the question of trespass­
ers did not arise.
